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In recent years, executive compensation of listed companies has generally 
achieved rapid growth and has become the focus of public concern. There are many 
studies about the problem of executive compensation, however, there are two main 
issues: On the one hand, about the study of the relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate performance, domestic scholars are often using the 
traditional accounting performance evaluation indicators to measure the performance 
of listed companies, but don’t consider the deficiencies of using the accounting 
performance evaluation indicators. On the other hand, as an indicator of evaluating 
corporate performance, economic value added (EVA) is popular. But scholars often 
just compare EVA with the traditional accounting performance indicators to study its 
effectiveness to measure corporate performance, and no studies about the link 
between corporate EVA-based performance and executive compensation in China. 
Taking the differences between different industries into account, this paper selects all 
listed manufacturing companies of China between the year of 2003 and the year of 
2008 for the study sample, and attempts to clarify the relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate EVA-based performance. And this paper mainly 
discusses from the following two aspects: (1) whether there is a significant positive 
correlation between executive compensation and corporate EVA-based performance 
in listed manufacturing companies in China; (2) compared with the case of using the 
traditional accounting indicators to measure the corporate performance，how to 
define the effects that company size, board characteristics, corporate ownership 
structure and other factors have an impact on the sensitivity between executive 
compensation and corporate EVA-based performance of listed manufacturing 
companies in China.  
   By building multiple regression analysis model and using hypothesis testing 














correlation between executive compensation and corporate EVA-based performance 
in listed manufacturing companies in China, at the same time, company size, board 
characteristics, corporate ownership structure and other factors don’t affect this 
correlation. And empirical results also show that there is a significant negative 
correlation between company size and the EVA-based performance-compensation 
sensitivity in listed manufacturing companies in China, but the negative effects will 
significantly show up only when the size of those companies grows to a certain level. 
There is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors and the EVA-based performance-compensation sensitivity; however, there 
is no correlation between the number of directors in board and the EVA-based 
performance-compensation sensitivity, and no correlation between dual role of the 
Board Chairman and the EVA-based performance-compensation sensitivity. These 
conclusions have important theoretical value in establishing the EVA-based 
executive compensation incentive mechanism when the size of listed manufacturing 
companies has reached a certain level in China. 
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上市公司高管薪酬问题早已是社会普遍关注的问题，2008 年 5 月，上海荣
正投资咨询有限公司报告显示，2007 年我国 1494 家上市公司高管年薪平均值
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